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ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding its pivotal role in the thought of Indian early grammarians, the exact mean‑
ing of the term śabda remains vague and hard to determine for an inexperienced student. The 
difficulty is not simply due to polysemy or ambiguity. The ancient user of the term śabda seems 
entirely unaware of any distinctions within the semantic range of the word, taking its meaning 
for granted. The objective of the present paper is to investigate various contexts of the word in 
order to elucidate its meaning as understood by Indian grammarians, with particular emphasis 
laid on the followers of the śabdādvaita school.
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FROM MYSTICISM OF LANGUAGE TO ITS DESCRIPTIVE 
GRAMMAR
OM
catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roraviti maho devo martyāṁ ā viveśa |
[It has four horns, three feet, two heads and seven hands
Triply bound the bull is roaring! The great god entered the mortal] (Transl. P.S.). 
(RV IV.58.3)
The above description of a rather fancy, not to say weird, creature comes from 
a Vedic hymn and is largely believed to be a description of a language. Accord‑
ing to Patañjali1 the four horns are the four parts of speech (noun, verb, prepo‑
sition and particle), three feet are the three tenses (past, future and present), 
two heads are two essences of the word — one eternal and the other as a result 
of human activity, seven hands are the seven cases of the declension (vibhakti), 
the triple bonds are the three places (sthāna) of origin of a word, i.e. the chest, 
the throat and the head, the roaring of the bull is the word or linguistic sound 
(śabda). The word is further referred to as ‘the great god’ who enters the hu‑
man beings and enables them to speak. It is by no means the only possible and 
existing interpretation of the mysterious four ‑horned and two ‑headed beast 
but all of them share the same certainty — the words of the hymn tell about 
language.
It hardly ever occurs to a western man that linguistics or grammar could 
be associated with any kind of mysticism or that they should be treated as 
the fundamental disciplines of all human knowledge. In India a proposition 
that the language is the most pivotal subject to study and that the study may 
bring one liberation, may pass for a platitude. In fact, the reasons for hold‑
ing language and linguistics in such extraordinary reverence date back to early 
Vedic times. An offering ceremony was to reproduce on a microcosmic scale 
the macrocosmic principle of ṛta. Had the priest failed to perform everything 
to a nicety, the sacrifice would inevitably turn against him or against the one 
in whose favour the offering had been performed. Each sacrifice consists of 
some permanent elements: the fire, the offering material and the words of 
a Vedic hymn properly intoned. Actually, the word ‘properly’ should be em‑
phasized all through the offer. If anything were not performed ‘properly’, the 
sacrifice would fail to be auspicious. On the contrary, its consequences would 
prove menacing for the sacrificer. Thus the priest who intoned the words of 
1  MBh 1, p. 64: catvāri śṛṅgāni catvāri pada ‑jātāni nāmākhyātopasarga ‑nipātāḥ ca. trayaḥ 
asya pādāḥ trayaḥ kālāḥ bhūta ‑bhaviṣyad ‑vartamānāḥ. dve śīrṣe dvau śabdātmānau nityaḥ kāryaḥ 
ca. sapta hastāsaḥ asya sapta vibhaktayaḥ. tridhā baddhaḥ triṣu sthāneṣu baddhaḥ urasi kaṇṭhe śirasi 
iti. vṛṣabhaḥ varṣaṇāt. roraviti śabdaṁ karoti. kutaḥ etat. rautiḥ śabda ‑karmā.
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a hymn (udgātṛ) had to do his best to intone them precisely, which involved 
the necessity of correct pronunciation of vowels and consonants, the right pitch 
etc. The priest (udgātṛ) had to master the language, its grammar, its syntax, its 
phonetics included. It was the language that properly used had the power to 
yield success or wrongly used could cause misfortune. The language compelled 
respect and in the Vedic times identified with the goddess Vāc, who has been 
held in high esteem up to our days.
EARLY UPANISHADIC UNDERSTANDING OF ŚABDA
There is no explicit term denoting what we call ‘the word’. On the one hand 
the Sanskrit noun śabda may mean ‘a word’, but also ‘a phoneme’, ‘a sentence’ 
or just ‘a sound’, depending on the author and on the context, on the other 
hand English ‘word’ can be understood as śabda or pada,2 depending on the 
context. Initially śabda signified any sound, not necessarily even a linguistic one 
or one produced by means of vocal organ. The sacred syllable AUM, which 
covers all possible meanings of the past, the presence and the future, was called 
śabda. MāṇḍU identifies the syllable (akṣara) with brahman and with the high‑
est self (ātman). Remote as the doctrine still was from the subsequent theory 
of Bhartṛhari, both theories share one crucial feature: both in MāṇḍU and 
in Bhartṛhari the issue of the śabda ‑brahman seems to be inseparably associ‑
ated with the idea of time. The doctrines are obviously different,3 so that the 
Upanishadic concept of time can be at most considered as the germ of the 
Bhartṛharian theory of kāla ‑śakti, if not a parallel scheme. Nevertheless, taking 
into account the gap of about a millennium between Māṇḍū and Bhartṛhari, it 
can be assumed that the germ of the idea in the Upanishad, had a sufficiently 
long period of time to develop into an elaborate doctrine of the grammarian 
school.
COLLECTING WORDS: FIRST LEXICONS
Words, the basic meaningful components of the language, the integral part 
of each sacrifice, were considered sacred, therefore they became the object of 
collecting. Every reader of a Sanskrit text must first distinguish and isolate 
words which are not written separately but grouped together as far as the 
2  There are no lexical equivalents of Sanskrit śabda and pada, both being denoted by ‘word’. 
Polish equivalents of śabda and pada are słowo and wyraz respectively. Cf. Sajdek, 2011: 18–20.
3  Sastri B. Gaurinath suggests: ‘But we must be careful not to identify the Śabdabrahman 
of the grammarian with the Śabdabrahman of the Upaniṣads, for according to Bhartṛhari 
Śabdabrahman is identical with the Transcendental Reality’ (Gaurinath, 1980: XXIV).
186 Paweł SAJDEK
devanāgarī script allows to do so. Moreover, according to Sanksrit spelling 
rules, the devanāgarī script is expected to render all phonetic changes, includ‑
ing sandhi rules, like losing sonority of the final voiced consonant, etc. There‑
fore, before reading, words had to be sundered. The first text to undergo such 
a process was Ṛgveda and one of the first authors of such a textual analysis was 
Śākalya. His work Padapāṭha is an analysis of the Saṁhitā text in which he not 
only separated words, but also isolated components of compounds so char‑
acteristic for Sanskrit. Śaunaka, the reputed author of a prātiśākhya known 
as Bṛhaddevatā, distinguishes a sentence (vākya) consisting of words (pada), 
which consist of phonemes (varṇa). Real collections of words, however, were 
texts called nighaṇṭu, regarded as the first lexicons in the world. Vedic texts 
were becoming increasingly archaic. In order to preserve the correct pronun‑
ciation of vedic words it was no longer sufficient to make a pada ‑pāṭha. The 
words were listed, collected and grouped according to their form and mean‑
ing. The most famous author of a commentary to a nighaṇṭu, Yāska, defined 
it as follows:
The list [of words] to memorize. This needs elucidation. Such a list is called nighaṇṭavaḥ. 
Where does it come from? From nigamāḥ [the Vedic words] (Lakshman, 1961).4
YĀSKA: CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS
It was Yāska, the author of the famous Nirukta, who first divided words into 
classes called pada ‑jāta, counterparts of our ‘parts of speech’. The classes are: 
name (nāman), verb (ākhyāta), preposition (upasarga) and particle (nipāta). 
The class of names includes nouns, pronouns (sarvanāman) and adjectives, so 
everything inflected for case. One of the most inspiring ideas of Yāska was as‑
sociating the definitions of noun (nāman) and verb (ākhyāta) with verbal roots 
(dhātu) as and bhū respectively. Here are the definitions:
The basis of a verb is ‘becoming’ (bhāva), the basis of a noun is ‘being’ (sattva).5
The terms are derivatives of bhū and as, both meaning ‘be’, ‘exist’, the for‑
mer denoting ‘being’ more in the sense of ‘becoming’, ‘changing’, whereas 
the latter ‘being’ in a more static sense. Consequently, the essence of a verb is 
determined by change, movement, action, whereas a noun is considered to be 
the motionless, changeless and static element. Yāska was arguably one of the 
first thinkers who associated linguistics with ontology.
4  Nir 1.1.1: samāmnāyaḥ samāmnātaḥ. sa vyākhyātavyaḥ. tam imaṁ samāmnāyaṁ nighaṇṭava 
ity ācakṣate. nighaṇṭavaḥ kasmāt? nigamā ime bhavanti.
5  Nir 1.1: bhāva ‑pradhānam ākhyātaṁ sattva ‑pradhānāni namāni.
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Nearly a millenium later Bhartṛhari, the greatest philosopher of the gram‑
marian and śabdādvaita school, considered bhāva and sattva to be two aspects 
of sattā, the Ultimate Reality, the śabda ‑brahman. If the Reality is manifested 
as a sequence of time (kāla), it is referred to as bhāva or kriyā, without the 
sequence of time as sattva. The term sattā was by no means a new coinage of 
Bhartṛhari, his original contribution, however, was distinguishing between sat‑
tva and sattā.
Subsequent thinkers of advaita school took advantage of the differentia‑
tion in their attempt to elucidate the ontological status of empirical reality 
(vyavahāra). The eternal, changeless, unmoving Ultimate Being ‘is’ (asti), 
whereas the ever ‑changing phenomenal world ‘is being’, as it were, ‘is becom‑
ing’. The world cannot be predicated in terms of ‘being’ (sattva), neither can 
Brahman be predicated in terms of ‘becoming’ (bhāva). The principle of inex‑
pressibility of ontological status of the phenomenal world in terms of being 
and non ‑being (sad ‑asad ‑anirvacanīyatva) became part of the doctrine of the 
bhāmatī ‑school of advaitavedānta.
PATAÑJALI’S INSTRUCTION IN ŚABDA: DEFINITION
The initial words of the eminent and vast commentary on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī 
(Śriśa, 1891–1898) written by Patañjali are as follows: ‘Here is the instruc‑
tion in śabda’ (atha śabdānuśāsanam). The first definition proposed by Patañjali 
refers to the colloquial meaning of the word: ‘So śabda is said to be a sound 
( dhvani) which people associate with a meaningful word (pada). […] Thus 
śabda is a sound (dhvani)’.6 The ‘association with a meaningful word’ consists 
in the signifying power of the word (artha ‑śakti) which lies therein. That being 
so, whenever the sound gauḥ is perceived, a cow is visualized. We can easily in‑
dicate the referent when we hear gauḥ (‘cow’) or aśva (‘horse’). Some elements 
of language, however, fail to ‘signify’ in a similar way: atha, iti, pra, pari, upa, 
uta etc. Should they be considered to be ‘words’ (śabda)?
The sound ‘associated with a meaningful word’ (pratīta ‑padārthakaḥ) re‑
quires the context of worldly practice (loka ‑vyavahāra) beyond which its mean‑
ing cannot be understood. Therefore words like prepositions (upasarga) and 
particles (nipāta) are also treated as śabda, though in isolation they fail to have 
a meaning of their own. Thus the formula: ‘a word (śabda) is a sound (dhvani) 
and meaning (artha)’ — covers all elements of a language.
It is not sufficient for a word to be a sound. The sound must be articulated 
(uccarita), pronounced by means of our vocal organ, it must be a language 
sound, associated with meaning. Consequently, word (śabda) must have two 
6  MBh 1, p. 19: athavo pratīta ‑padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate. […] tasmād dhvaniḥ 
śabdaḥ.
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natures: phonetic, as physically pronounced (uccārita) by means of speech or‑
gans and semantic, as a signifié, being a notion (pratyaya) in the recipient’s 
mind. Hence another attempt to define śabda:
What is perceived by hearing, grasped by intelect, elucidated by utterance and posi‑
tioned in space (ākāśa) — is word (śabda)7 (Transl. P.S.).
Patañjali follows the nyāya doctrine in which sound is the only attribute 
of space (ambara ‑guṇa), a vibration of ether (ākāśa), perceivable for the sense 
organ of hearing (śruta) consisting of the identical element, according to the 
Empedocles’ principle ‘similar by similar’ (ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ). One point, how‑
ever, remains vague: how is it possible that the vibration of ether is capable to 
transfer a notion to the intellect. The nature of sound is identical with ether, 
entirely different from the mental nature of intellect. Why is an utterance ac‑
cessible to the ear (śrutopalabdhi) capable of conveying mental contents, acces‑
sible to the intellect (buddhi ‑nigrāhya)?
Patañjali advocates the view that the meaningful element which he called 
sphoṭa is possible to be revealed by phonemes (varṇābhivyaṅgya). Their con‑
nection with the meaning is permanent and eternal. To support this thesis 
Patañjali quotes the legendary sage Vyāḍi:
Then is word eternal or is it a result? […] Words are eternal and in the eternal words 
there must be changeless, unmoved, not subject to destructibility and birth phonemes 
(Transl. P.S.).8
Words being eternal, they precede their users in time. A man seeks for the 
right word in himself rather than creates a word he intends to use anew, since 
he was born with all necessary vocabulary already present in him. If words were 
just human products, argues Patañjali, we would buy them from a grammarian 
like jars from a potter.
ARE PHONEMES MEANINGFUL? PATAÑJALI’S PROS AND CONS
Patañjali seemed to anticipate a subsequent famous polemics between gram‑
marians and mīmāṁsā ‑school. In the opinion of the latter, the meaning lies 
in phonemes and nowhere else, whereas grammarians claimed the existence 
of a meaningful element called sphoṭa which is above or beyond the physical 
sounds. According to them the linguistic unit like ‘word’ (pada) (the view of 
7  MBh 1, p. 98: śrotropalabdhir buddhi ‑nirgrāhyaḥ prayogeṇābhijvalita ākāśa ‑deśaḥ śabdaḥ.
8  MBh 1, p. 57.96: kiṁ punaḥ nityaḥ śabdaḥ āhosvit kāryaḥ? […] nityāś ca śabdāḥ. nityeṣu ca 
śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālabhir varṇair anapāyopajana ‑vikāribhiḥ.
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Maṇḍana Miśra; cf. Sajdek, 2011) or ‘sentence’ (vākya) (the view of Bhartṛhari) 
is indivisible and understandable only as a whole. Phonemes are artificial prod‑
ucts of linguistic analysis of a word (pada), as well as word division is nothing 
more than a result of analysis of a sentence. Unlike a foreigner who must divide 
an utterance into smaller items in order to grasp the meaning, a native speaker of 
a language never analyses an utterance. Each utterance forms an indivisible, self‑
‑contained whole, so that any analysis of it is only a secondary and auxiliary act. 
Patañjali seems to be the first to pose the question: ‘So do the phonemes have 
any meaning or are they void of any meaning?’.9 His answer was not straight‑
forward. Initially he argues for the meaningfulness of phonemes, providing as 
many as four arguments for it. Firstly, there exist one ‑syllable (one ‑phoneme) 
words in the language: ‘We believe that phonemes are meaningful seeing that 
there are one ‑syllable verb roots, nominal bases, affixes and particles’.10
The existence of one ‑phoneme words proves that one phoneme suffices to 
convey the meaning. It might be argued, however, that conveying the mean‑
ing is not identical with being meaningful. The second argument seems more 
convincing and, what makes it still more interesting is its striking similarity to 
modern phonology: ‘[Phonemes are meaningful] because a phoneme replaced 
by another phoneme changes the meaning [of the word]’.11
A substitution of one phoneme for another results in a change of meaning, 
like in kūpa (well), sūpa (soup), yūpa (column). This leads us to the conclusion 
that ka, sa and ya are s emant i c a l l y  dfferent. A contemporary phonologist 
would indicate a distinctive feature in each of the phonemes. Patañjali was 
not far from the idea of binary phonological description. The third argument: 
‘When a phoneme is not perceived, the meaning is not understood’.12
In the above example the meaning changed when one phoneme was sub‑
stituted for another (y for k, s for k etc.). If the first phoneme were entirely 
removed, the remaining ūpa would make no sense at all. Thus omitting one 
phoneme can deprive a word of its meaning. The noun kāṇḍīraḥ means ‘an 
archer’, but āṇḍīraḥ does not provide us with any knowledge (an ‑artha ‑gatiḥ). 
Should we draw the conclusion then that all the meaning of kāṇḍīraḥ is con‑
tained in the first phoneme? The conclusion would be valid if the omitted 
phoneme, pronounced in isolation, conveyed the knowledge of an archer, but it 
is not so. Besides, the word ṛkṣa (‘a bear’) is complete, though one phoneme va 
added at the beginning of the word would radically change its meaning (vṛkṣa = 
‘tree’). Actually, the problem lies in an aggregate (saṁghāta). Each time a dif‑
ferent aggregate of phonemes is pronounced. It is aggregates that have their 
9  MBh 1, p.131: kiṁ punaḥ ime varṇāḥ arthavantaḥ āhosvit anarthakāḥ?
10  MBh 1, p.131: dhātu ‑pratipādika ‑pratyaya ‑nipātānām eka ‑varṇānām artha ‑darṣanāt 
manyāmahe arthavantaḥ varṇāḥ iti.
11  MBh 1, p.131: varṇa ‑vyatyaye ca arthāntara ‑gamanāt.
12  MBh 1, p.131: varṇānupalabdhau ca anartha ‑gateḥ.
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own meanings. Hence the fourth argument: ‘We believe that phonemes are 
meaningful, because the aggregates they belong to are meaningful’.13
A meaningful aggregate must consist of meaningful components. Were it 
not so, the aggregate itself would not be meaningful. Just like one man can 
see with his eyes, so can a group of a hundred men. On the contrary, just like 
a blind cannot see anything, so cannot even a hundred blind men. The conclu‑
sion is that phonemes must be meaningful, because the aggregate formed by 
them is meaningful.
After the above four arguments for meaningfulness of phonemes, Patañjali 
begins, like in a European scholastic quaestio, his sed contra argumentation. 
Firstly, a nominal base, like rājan, taking declension endings, undergoes some 
phonetic rules, like eliding the final  ‑n before consonantal endings (rājabhiḥ, 
rājabhyaḥ, rājasu). The elision (varṇopāya) does not change anything in mean‑
ing, which would be the case if the phoneme ‘n’ were meaningful. Secondly, 
an exchange of phonemes (varṇa ‑vyatyaya) is not tantamount to an exchange 
of meanings (artha ‑vyatyaya), like in siṁhaḥ vs. hiṁsaḥ. Thirdly, if phonemes 
were meaningful, we would not be able to grasp the meaning by hearing each 
of them apart.
It is true that phonemes are the smallest units differentiating the meaning 
but they lack a meaning of their own. According to Ptañjali, the smallest mean‑
ingful unit is an aggregate (saṅghāta), which should be regarded as an indivisible 
entity. Such an aggregate, consisting of phonemes arranged in the definite order, 
is called a word (śabda). To be more exact, a word (śabda) does not ‘consist’ of 
anything, even of phonemes which are only a secondary effect of analysis. A word 
(śabda) can be considered as sound (dhvani) and the meaningful element (sphoṭa). 
Their relation to the word is not equal. Sound (dhvani) is only an attribute of the 
word, whereas sphoṭa is its essence, sphoṭa is the word (śabda) itself.14 It can signify 
both individual substances (dravya) and universal ideas (ākṛti).15
Between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari there was a gap of about a millenium. 
The passage of time is slow in India and ideas have long lives. Bhartṛhari was 
a natural successor and inheritor of Patañjali and Kātyāyana.
FROM DESCRIPTIVE GRAMMAR TO MYSTICISM OF LANGUAGE
Bhartṛhari drew all possible consequences from Patañjali’s discovery of an indi‑
visible aggregate (saṅghāta) as the smallest meaningful entity. An aggregate is 
13  MBh 1, p.131: saṅghātārthattvāc ca manyāmahe arthavanto varṇā iti.
14  MBh 1, p.131: sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabda ‑guṇaḥ.
15  MBh 1, p. 56: kiṁ punar ākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ āhosvid dravyam? ubhayam ity āha. The former 
view was associated with the name of Vyāḍi, the latter with Vājapyāyana. According to Patañjali, 
Pāṇini accepted both opinions and so did he.
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the word (śabda) because the correct understanding of its meaning involves the 
necessity of hearing the whole of it. For Patañjali such an aggregate was first of 
all a word understood as pada which can be the name of an individual substance 
or of a universal idea. For Bhartṛhari such an indivisible entity (akhaṇḍa ‑pakṣa) 
was the whole sentence (vākya) — ‘one individed word’.16 Just like a word 
(pada) is not a group of phonemes, so a sentence (vākya) is not a group of 
words. Words (pada) are some kind of fiction created as a result of analysing 
a sentence. It may happen that the whole utterance contains only one word. 
Seeing an animal with horns etc. one says: ‘Cow!’ — but the meaning is that of 
a sentence: ‘What I see in front of me is a cow’. Similarly in Patañjali one pho‑
neme could be the whole word, but the meaning was associated with the word, 
not with the phoneme. Were the division real, there would be no reason for 
desisting from further divisions, up to some physically indivisible theoretical 
entity like atom. Therefore Bhartṛhari says: ‘There are no phonemes in a word 
(pada) and there are no components in a phoneme. It is not possible to isolate 
ultimately words (pada) from a sentence’.17
The entire sentence is one undivided word (śabda), one sphoṭa. Bhartṛhari 
referred do a sentence (vākya) as to a self ‑contained whole. While listening to 
the sentence the hearer experiences a sudden enlightment called pratibhā as 
for the meaning of the whole. Only a user of the language who is not its na‑
tive speaker would analyze the sentence, separating words, sundering meanings 
from the general meaning etc. Actually, the relation of a word and its meaning 
(vācya ‑vācaka ‑bhāva) is that of identity. Tha word (śabda) and the meaning 
(artha) share the essence. Only the word is ultimately real, the meaning being 
its manifestation (vivarta) engendered by the power of time (kāla ‑śakti). In the 
first verse of his Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari declares:
The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who 
is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the 
creation of the world proceeds […] (Subramania, 1965).18
The Highest Being is essentially the Word (śabda ‑tattva). To say that one 
Brahman is cognized as the plurality and manifoldness of the empirical world, 
is almost identical with stating that one Word is cognized as multitude of 
words in a language. In both cases the reason is superimposition (adhyāsa). 
The word ‘almost’ indicates the subtle difference between classical advaita of 
Śaṅkara or Maṇḍana and śabdādvaita of Bhartṛhari. In advaita the phenomenal 
16  VP II.1: eko ʼnavayavaḥ śabdaḥ.
17  VP I.73: pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā na ca | vākyāt padānām atyantaṁ 
pravibhāgo na kaścana.
18  VP I.1: anādi ‑nidhanaṁ brahma śabda ‑tattvaṁ yad akṣaram | vivartate ʼrtha ‑bhāvena 
prakriyā jagato yataḥ.
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world (vyavahāra) is ilusory and caused by a cognitive error. In Bhartṛhari the 
Word has some powers (śakti), especially kāla ‑śakti — time ‑power, responsible 
for the manifestation of the world of plurality. The manifestation is, it might 
be said, due to the will of the Eternal Word, so it cannot be treated as thor‑
oughly unreal. The world of plurality is, as it were, the simple, undifferenti‑
ated, simultaneous śabda manifested through the power of time (kāla ‑śakti) as 
a sequence of things and events. This is the ‘proceeding of the creation of the 
world’ (prakriyā jagataḥ) mentioned in VP I.1. The crucial function of time is 
that of allowing and prohibiting things to come into being and to last shorter 
or longer. This function secures order in the world and protects it from chaos. 
Bhartṛhari says:
If it does not prevent and if it does not lift the prohibition, there would be confusion 
in the state of things, being devoid of sequence (Subramania, 1965).19
Bhartṛhari assumed three levels of speech. The audible sound produced with 
the organs of speech (vāg ‑indriya) is only an external manifestation (bāhya‑
‑rūpa) called vaikharī. This lowest level of speech is the subject of descriptive 
grammar. Before materialization in physical sounds, the speech is born in heart 
(hṛdaya) as inner speech (abhyantara), having a mental nature. This level is 
called madhyamā. The highest level is the hidden speech called paśyantī, the 
supreme manifestation of one indivisible Eternal Word, free from any sequence 
or division. It is said to be the source of light in which everything is seen, 
like eternal, unfading moon — hence the name. Thus grammar returns to its 
source — mysticism of language, contemplation of the Highest Word (parā 
vāk),20 the Ultimate Being, the source of all creation, the Logos.
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